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Abstract. This work addresses the security and privacy issues in re-
mote biometric authentication by proposing an efficient mechanism to
verify the correctness of the outsourced computation in such protocols.
In particular, we propose an efficient verifiable computation of XOR-
ing encrypted messages using an XOR linear message authentication
code (MAC) and we employ the proposed scheme to build a biometric
authentication protocol. The proposed authentication protocol is both
secure and privacy-preserving against malicious (as opposed to honest-
but-curious) adversaries. Specifically, the use of the verifiable computation
scheme together with an homomorphic encryption protects the privacy
of biometric templates against malicious adversaries. Furthermore, in
order to achieve unlinkability of authentication attempts, while keeping
a low communication overhead, we show how to apply Oblivious RAM
and biohashing to our protocol. We also provide a proof of security for
the proposed solution. Our simulation results show that the proposed
authentication protocol is efficient.
Key words: Verifiable computation, universal hash functions, homomor-
phic encryption, biometric authentication, template privacy and security.
1 Introduction
Following the rapid growth of mobile and cloud computing, outsourcing
computations to the cloud has increasingly become more attractive. Many
practical applications, however, require not only the privacy of the sensi-
tive data in such computations, but also the verifiability of correctness
of the outsourced computations. There has been a wealth of work on
verifiable computations in recent years, see, e.g., [1–3] and the references
therein. One type of outsourced computation, in biometric authentication
with distributed entities, is the computation over encrypted bitstrings
(e.g., encrypted biometric templates) to obtain the XOR of two bitstrings
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(e.g., the XOR of the fresh and reference biometric templates). Consider,
for instance, the following biometric authentication protocol consisting of
three entities, namely, a set C of clients Ci, for i “ 1, ¨ ¨ ¨ , N , one for each
user Ui, a cloud server CS with a database DB, and an authentication
server SP. Each client Ci has a sensor that extracts biometric templates
from its owner’s biometrics (e.g., fingerprints). The cloud server CS stores
the reference biometric templates and performs calculations. The authen-
tication server SP takes the final decision depending on whether there is
a match between the fresh and the reference biometric templates. This is
a reasonable model adopted in many research papers (cf. Related Work)
and the industry (e.g., [4]) considering the fast rise of cloud computing
and storage services, and also the widespread use of smartphones with
embedded biometric sensors. However, the privacy of biometric features
must be seriously taken into account in such architectures, since its dis-
closure may lead to breaches in security and traceability of users among
services, besides the inherent private information disclosure.
Let us consider a simple example of a biometric authentication protocol
using an homomorphic encryption scheme. Let HE “ pKeyGen,Enc,Decq be
a hypothetical homomorphic encryption (HE) scheme and f a function such
that f
`
Encpmq,Encpm1q˘ “ Enc`m‘m1˘, for m, m1 in the domain of Enc,
where ‘ is the XOR operation. Suppose that the encryption/decryption
keys pk{sk are generated by the authentication server SP and pk is
distributed to CS and all Ci. Then, the protocol works as follows. During the
enrollment phase, the client Ci provides an encrypted reference biometric
template Encpbiq, along with the user IDi for storage in the database DB
on the CS side. During the authentication phase, the client Ci provides
an encrypted fresh biometric template Encpb1iq and a claimed user IDi to
CS, which then retrieves Encpbiq corresponding to IDi from its database,
computes ctbi‘b1i “ f
`
Encpbiq,Encpb1iq
˘ “ Enc`bi ‘ b1i˘ and sends ctbi‘b1i
to SP. Finally, SP decrypts ctbi‘b1i and checks if the Hamming weight
HWpbi ‘ biq ď τ , where τ is a predefined authentication threshold. If
HWpbi ‘ biq ď τ , then the user is granted access; otherwise, he/she is
rejected. Note that HWpbi‘b1iq is equal to the Hamming distance HDpbi, b1iq.
At a first glance, the protocol may seem secure against a malicious
CS, with respect to both the fresh and the stored template privacy. How-
ever, this only holds under the assumption that CS honestly performs
the intended calculation, since there is no mechanism in place to prevent
or detect cheating. By computing a function, g, different than what the
protocol specifies (or the intended function f but on different inputs than
the legitimate ones), and using SP as an oracle, CS can learn information
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about either the stored reference biometric template bi or the fresh bio-
metric template b1i. As an example CS could compute gpEncpbiq,Encpvqq,
where v is a chosen vector by CS, and subsequently send the result to
SP, which outputs OutSP . By mounting a variant of the hill climbing
attack [5], performing multiple repeated attempts, each time carefully
choosing v, the stored template bi can be retrieved. Such attacks against
several protocols proposed in [6–8] are presented in [9–11]. Therefore,
in similar applications it is important to verify the correctness of the
outsourced computation, namely, the computation of XORing encrypted
bitstrings. Moreover, verifiable computation of XOR is what we need in
order to mitigate such an attack by a malicious CS on the above presented
protocol. Here, we propose an efficient scheme for verifying the correctness
of the outsourced XOR computation and apply it to biometric authenti-
cation. To our knowledge, the employment of verifiable computation in
privacy-preserving biometric authentication has not been studied before,
although the infeasibility of (fully) homomorphic encryption alone for
privacy-preserving cloud computing is already known [12].
Contributions. In this work, we propose an efficient verifiable com-
putation of XORing encrypted messages using an XOR linear message
authentication code (MAC) and we build a biometric authentication pro-
tocol that is secure and privacy-preserving in the malicious (as opposed
to the honest-but-curious) adversary model. In the proposed protocol, the
use of homomorphic encryption (HE) and the XOR linear MAC scheme
protects the privacy of biometric templates against the malicious cloud,
while the secret identity to an index map provides anonymity. However,
the authentication protocol does not hide access patterns from the cloud.
This could be avoided using Private Information Retrieval, but at the
expense of a large communication overhead. Hence we further propose
an extension of the protocol using oblivious RAM (ORAM). Since bi ‘ b1i
is revealed to SP in the proposed protocol, we also discuss how to make
it robust against leakage of information regarding the user’s biometric
characteristics by employing biohashing techniques.
Related work. Privacy-preserving biometric authentication has attracted
considerable attention over the last decade. Multiple protocols for privacy-
preserving biometric authentication are based on secure multi-party com-
putation techniques including oblivious transfer [13] and homomorphic
encryption [14, 15], as well as on private information retrieval [16, 17].
Bringer et al. [8] proposed a distributed biometric authentication protocol
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using the Goldwasser-Micali cryptosystem [15] to protect the privacy of
the biometric templates against honest-but-curious (or passive) adversaries.
Nevertheless, some attacks on this protocol were reported in [5, 11, 18].
In [11], the authors have also improved upon the Bringer et al. proto-
col to achieve security against malicious but non-colluding adversaries.
Simoens et al. [5] also presented a framework for analysing the security
and privacy-preserving properties of biometric authentication protocols. In
particular, they showed how biometric authentication protocols designed
to be secure against honest-but-curious adversaries can be broken in the
presence of malicious insider adversaries. They described several attacks
against protocols proposed in [8,18,19]. There are also other protocols for
privacy-preserving biometric authentication that are based on additive
HE [14,20] such as [21] for face recognition and its subsequent improve-
ment in [22], as well as the protocol in [23]. Yasuda et al. proposed two
biometric authentication protocols using somewhat HEs based on ideal
lattices [6] and ring learning with errors [7], and the security of these
protocols is scrutinised in [9, 10]. In most of these schemes, biometric
templates are extracted as bitstrings and the similarity of two biometric
templates is measured by computing the Hamming distance between them.
For this reason, in [24] the authors have proposed protocols for secure
Hamming distance computation based on oblivious transfer. These have
potential applications in privacy-preserving biometric authentication. Re-
cently Bringer et al. [25] generalised their results for secure computation
of other distances such as the Euclidean and the normalised Hamming
distance. Oblivious transfer was also used in SCiFi [26].
Outline. The rest of the paper is organised as follows. Sect. 2 intro-
duces the necessary background. Section 3 presents our adversary model.
In Section 4, we present our protocol for biometric authentication employ-
ing the scheme for verifiable computation of XOR. Section 5 shows how
ORAM can be applied to our protocol. Finally, Section 6 concludes the
paper.
2 Preliminaries
Homomorphic encryption. For our purposes, the employed HE scheme
must be such that given Encpmq and Encpm1q, it is possible to homomor-
phically compute EncpDistpm,m1qq, where Dist is a distance metric. We
require the HE scheme to have semantic security against chosen plain-
text attacks. Consider the following game played between a probabilistic
polynomial time (PPT) adversary and a challenger:
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ExpIND-CPAHE,A pλq:
ppk, skq, Ð KeyGenpλq; pm0,m1q, m0 ‰ m1 Ð Apλ, pkq;
β
RÐÝ t0, 1u; c Ð Encpmβ , pkq; β1 Ð Apm0,m1, c, pkq;
Return 1 if β1 “ β, 0 otherwise
and define the adversary’s advantage in this game as AdvIND-CPAHE,A pλq “ˇˇ
2 Pr
 
ExpIND-CPAHE,A pλq “ 1
(´ 1ˇˇ.
Definition 1. We say that HE is IND-CPA-secure if all PPT adversaries
have a negligible advantage in the above game: AdvIND-CPAHE,A pλq ď neglpλq.
Definition 2. A function negl : N ÞÑ r0, 1s is called negligible if for all
positive polynomials poly and sufficiently large λ P N: neglpλq ă 1{polypλq.
Message authentication codes. A message authentication code (MAC)
consists of pKeyGen,TAG,VRFYq (associated with a key space, a message
space and a tag space). KeyGen, a key generation algorithm, takes a
security parameter λ as input and outputs a key k (i.e., kÐ KeyGenpλq).
TAG, a tag generation algorithm, takes a message m and a key k as input,
and outputs a tag (i.e., tÐ TAGpm, kq). VRFY, a verification algorithm,
takes a message m, a tag t and a key k as input, and outputs a decision
OutMAC (i.e., OutMAC Ð VRFYpm, t, kq), which is 1 if the message-tag pair
pm, tq is valid, and 0 otherwise.
A typical construction of a MAC is via the use of Universal2 (U2)
hash functions, see [27–29] for more on U2 hash functions. There are
constructions of U2 hash functions that are ‘-linear [30], from which one
can construct an ‘-linear MAC scheme. Note that a MAC scheme is called
‘-linear if TAGpm1 ‘m2, kq “ TAGpm1, kq ‘ TAGpm2, kq.
Definition 3. A MAC is called pQT , QV , t, q-secure (or simply -secure)
if no PPT adversary A running in time at most t cannot generate a valid
message-tag pair, even after making QT tag generation queries to TAG
and QV verification queries to VRFY, except with probability .
Privacy-preserving biometric authentication. A privacy-preserving
biometric authentication (PPBA) protocol comprises:
– Setup: In this step, a trusted party runs the key generation algorithm
KeyGen for the employed cryptographic primitives (e.g., homomor-
phic encryption) using a security parameter λ as input: ppk, skq Ð
KeyGenpλq. The keys are distributed to the relevant parties.
– Enroll: This process collects the encrypted reference biometric template
Encpbiq and stores it along with additional user information such as the
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– Authen: This process takes an encrypted fresh biometric template
Encpb1iq and a claimed identity IDi, and involves actions from the pro-
tocol actors. This can be abstracted as OutSP Ð AuthenpEncpb1iq, IDiq.
The PPBA protocol is correct if the following definition is satisfied.
Definition 4 (Correctness). We say that a privacy-preserving biomet-
ric authentication protocol PPBA is correct if, for all enrolled user identities
IDi with the corresponding reference biometric templates bi, and for all
fresh biometric templates b1i, AuthenpEncpb1iq, IDiq results in a successful
authentication of the user with IDi if and only if Distpbi, b1iq ď τ .
We define the security of PPBA against a malicious adversary A as follows.
Consider the following game:
ExpPrivPPBA,Apλq:
ppk, skq Ð KeyGenpλq; DB Ð EnrollpIDi,Encpbiqq; b1i0 , b1i1 , b1i0 ‰ b1i1 Ð ApIDi, λ, pkq;
β
RÐÝ t0, 1u; Out Ð Authen`IDi,Encpb1iβ q˘; β1 Ð A`IDi, λ, pk, b1i0 , b1i1 ,Encpb1iβ q,DB,Out˘;
Return 1 if β1 “ β, 0 otherwise
and define the adversary’s advantage in this game as AdvPrivPPBA,Apλq “ˇˇ
2 PrtExpPrivPPBA,Apλq “ 1u ´ 1
ˇˇ
.
Definition 5 (Security and privacy). We say that PPBA is secure if,
for all PPT adversaries A, AdvPrivPPBA,Apλq ď neglpλq.
We assume that the adversary is given an oracle access to Authen
and is allowed to query it polynomially many times, e.g., polypλq times,
where λ may depend on the false acceptance rate. The adversary is also
given Encpb1iβ q. If the adversary cannot distinguish whether it is pIDi, b1i0q
or pIDi, b1i1q that is being used by Authen, then we say that the protocol
preserves privacy of the biometric templates.
3 Adversary model
In this paper, we focus on malicious as opposed to honest-but-curious,
adversaries and we consider a distributed setting, namely, each user Ui has
his/her own client Ci, a cloud computing server CS with its own database,
and an authentication server SP . The client Ci (e.g., a smartphone owned
by the user Ui) has a biometric sensor that extracts biometric templates
from the user. By requiring that each user Ui has a client Ci, potential
damages can be minimised in case the client Ci is stolen or lost. We assume
that each user trusts his/her own client device only to the extent that the
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biometric sensor and the extracted biometric template are only accessible
by the authorised apps on the user device. This is the minimal reasonable
assumption given the fact that most people nowadays have a smartphone
with an embedded biometric sensor, and without such a trust, users cannot
use their devices to remotely access services. This assumption has also to
be made in any type of authentication using client devices, e.g., password-
or token-based remote access. This assumption does not rule out the case
where an adversary is using several clients Ci, in collusion with the cloud
server, to impersonate a user that is not the owner of compromised clients.
However, we do note that if a client Ci is compromised, say, infected
by malware, then the reference biometric template of the owner Ui can
be recovered using the fresh biometric template provided by Ui by hill
climbing attacks [31].
The authentication server SP handles the keys for the employed en-
cryption scheme and is responsible for making the authentication decision
based on the underlying matching process used. We also consider the
authentication server SP as a trusted key managing entity which keeps
the secret keys secure and performs its task honestly. However, we do not
trust any biometric template to SP . The malicious party that we want to
have a full protection against is the cloud server CS. In our case the cloud
has a database that stores the encrypted reference biometric templates.
Additionally, CS performs computations on the encrypted fresh and refer-
ence biometric templates. The results of the computation will allow the
authentication server to make its decision. We consider a malicious cloud
server as a PPT adversary. We do not consider denial-of-service type of
attacks, which are easy to mount by CS, since it can always send a wrong
response which would with high probability result in a false rejection.
Regarding communication among the protocol actors, we assume that
the communication channel between the protocol entities is secure in order
to avoid replay attacks. This can be achieved by using TLS or IPsec. We
also only consider the case of a single client for each user, a single cloud
server, and a single authentication server.
4 The scheme and the protocol
The main idea behind the verifiable computation of XOR is that the client
stores homomorphically encrypted message-tag pairs (e.g., Encpmq, Encptq,
where t “ TAGpm, kq) in the cloud server. When the client provides a
new homomorphically encrypted message-tag pair (e.g., Encpm1q, Encpt1q,
where t1 “ TAGpm1, kq), the cloud server computes the designated func-
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tion on the encrypted messages and tags separately (e.g., ctm‘m1 “
fpEncpmq,Encpm1qq and ctt‘t1 “ fpEncptq,Encpt1qq), and returns the re-
sults to the client. The client decrypts the results and checks if the
tag is valid (i.e., m ‘ m1 Ð Decpctm‘m1q, t ‘ t1 Ð Decpctt‘t1q, and
VRFYpm‘m1, t‘ t1, kq). If the MAC verification is successful, then the
client can be sure (up to the security of the MAC scheme) that the cloud
server has performed the correct computation.
Below, we apply this simple method to build a privacy-preserving
biometric authentication protocol. In the description, HE is an encryption
scheme which allows the computation of XOR of encrypted messages, i.e.,
fpEncpmq,Encpm1qq “ Encpm ‘ m1q, and MAC is an XOR linear MAC.
The enrollment procedure Enroll involves the following interactions:
– SP generates ppk, skq Ð HE.KeyGenpλq using a security parameter λ.
– The user Ui is asked to provide a user identity IDi (e.g., a username or a
pseudonym, etc.) by his/her client Ci, which sends his IDi as part of an
enrollment request to SP.
– SP maps IDi to an index i (i.e., iÐ IDi) using a secret process known only
to itself. It then generates a key for the MAC using the security parameter λ
and IDi: ki Ð MAC.KeyGenpλ, IDiq. The tuple pi, pk, kiq is sent to Ci, and pk
to CS (the latter is only done once).
– After receiving pi, pk, kiq, Ci first obtains the reference biometric template
bi from the user Ui, computes ti “ TAGpbi, kiq, and encrypts the reference
biometric template and the tag to obtain Encpbiq and Encptiq, respectively. Ci
then provides pi,Encpbiq,Encptiqq to the database DB on the cloud server side
for storage.
– Ci and SP store pi, kiq locally.
It is important for security that the user enrollment is performed in a
secure and controlled environment.
The authentication Authen involves the following interactions:
– The user Ui initiates the authentication process by providing his/her iden-
tity IDi and a fresh biometric template b
1
i to Ci, which then computes
t1i “ TAGpb1i, kiq.
– Ci sends IDi as part of an authentication request to SP, and obtains pk from
SP.
– Ci computes Encpb1iq and Encpt1iq, and sends pi,Encpb1iq,Encpt1iqq to CS.
– CS retrieves pEncpbiq,Encptiqq corresp. to i from DB and computes ctbi‘b1i “
fpEncpbiq,Encpb1iqq “ Encpbi ‘ b1iq and ctti‘t1i “ fpEncptiq,Encpt1iqq “ Encpti ‘
t1iq, and sends pctbi‘bi , ctti‘t1i , i1q to SP.
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– SP extracts i from IDi and checks if the extracted i and the index i1 received
from CS are equal. If i ‰ i1, SP outputs K. Otherwise, SP retrieves the locally
stored ki corresponding to i, decrypts ctbi‘b1i and ctti‘t1i to obtain bi ‘ b1i and
ti ‘ t1i, respectively. If VRFYpbi ‘ b1i, ti ‘ t1i, kiq ““ 0, it outputs K. Otherwise,
it checks if the Hamming weight HWpbi ‘ b1iq ď τ . If this is the case, SP
authenticates the user Ui; otherwise, it outputs K.
From now on, we denote this protocol by PPBA-HE-MAC. It is straight-
forward to see that PPBA-HE-MAC is correct, since a legitimate user with
his/her own legitimate device can always successfully authenticate him-
self/herself as long as the fresh biometric template matches the reference
biometric template.
Security and privacy analysis. Intuitively, PPBA-HE-MAC is secure
as long as the employed HE scheme is IND-CPA-secure (cf. Definition
1) and the MAC scheme is -secure (cf. Definition 3). In any biometric
template recovery attack that makes use of the side channel information
(i.e., OutSP), CS needs to be able to submit to SP a ctbi‘b1i and ctti‘t1i
that encrypt a valid message-tag pair. The -security of the employed
MAC scheme does not allow this to happen. Furthermore, if OutSP ““ K,
CS does not know whether it is due to the MAC verification failure or the
mismatch between the fresh and the reference biometric template. Hence,
the protocol is secure against the malicious CS. The following summarises
the security of our protocol, and the proof is given in Appendix-A.
Theorem 1 (Security and privacy). The protocol PPBA-HE-MAC is
secure and privacy-preserving against the malicious CS according to our
Definition 5, if the employed HE is IND-CPA-secure and MAC -secure.
Simulation. PPBA-HE-MAC is efficient because both the MAC scheme
and the HE scheme can be implemented efficiently. The efficiency of
the ‘-linear MAC scheme in our case depends on the efficiency of the
employed U2 hash functions. One suitable family of U2 hash functions for
our instantiation is the construction by Krawczyk [30], which exploits a
Linear Feedback Shift Register to allow efficient hardware implementations.
This construction is also efficient on software. We refer the curious reader
to [32] for more on the software performance of U2 hash functions.
Note that our utilisation of a lightweight MAC scheme for verifying
the correctness of the outsourced computation contrasts nicely with the
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existing verifiable computation schemes. More precisely, efficiency is the
main issue with the existing verifiable computation schemes since they
are very heavy computationally and have a large overhead [33]. On the
other hand, our approach using a MAC scheme is very efficient regarding
computation cost.
Regarding the HE scheme, we demonstrate its efficiency by simulating
the Goldwasser-Micali encryption scheme [15] for various security lev-
els and biometric template lengths. The Goldwasser-Micali encryption
scheme supports homomorphic evaluation of the XOR operation, and their
primitives are the most heavy ones in our construction.
The simulations were performed on a Intel®Core™2 Duo CPU E8400
@ 3.00GHz x2 64 bit CentOS Linux 7 computer. The simulation software,
written in C++, linked the NTL v9.4.0 (Number Theory Library [34]),
GNU Multiple Precision Arithmetic Library v6.0.0 [35], for efficient multi-
precision arithmetics support. The security level and the corresponding
size of the prime factors are chosen according to the ECRYPT II recom-
mendations and the length of the biometric binary templates is chosen
following Daugman [36] and SCiFI [26]. The simulation setup and results
are shown in Table 1, the source code can be provided upon request via
anonymous channels.
Table 1: Simulation setup and results for the Goldwasser-Micali scheme.
Security level Size of prime Binary biometric Mean template Mean template
in bits factors in bits template length encoding time rss decoding time rss
80 1248 900 9.22 ¨ 10´3 2.06 ¨ 10´1
2048 2.09 ¨ 10´2 4.69 ¨ 10´1
128 3248 900 3.79 ¨ 10´2 6.51 ¨ 10´1
2048 8.60 ¨ 10´2 1.48
We remark that since our aim is to show the feasibility of the HE scheme,
the implementation is not optimised. Also, the simulations are run on
single core, even though the Goldwasser-Micali encryption and decryption
procedures can be done in parallel, since it is a bitwise encryption scheme.
Therefore, the simulation results show that the HE scheme required for
our instantiation is not only feasible, but also efficient.
5 Protocol extensions
Oblivious RAM (ORAM) for hiding access patterns. Our protocol
can be easily extended to protect the access pattern of the client Ci
towards the cloud server CS. However, existing methods such as Private
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Information Retrieval (PIR) come at an elevated communication overhead.
To reduce such costs, we suggest the use of ORAM instead, as a more
suitable mechanism, and its use, as presented by this work, would not alter
the underlying security properties of the main protocol. ORAM allows a
client to hide the entry as well as the access pattern from the server at a
significantly reduced communication vs PIR. Moreover, ORAM security is
derived from the indistinguishability of any two access patterns Apyq and
Apy1q, for any two respective queries y and y1. The concept was initially
presented by Goldreich and Ostrovsky [37] in 1996. Since then, the field has
seen the introduction of various protocols with improved mechanisms and
primitives, e.g., [38]. These advances on protocol efficiency have motivated
the apparition of new applications such as, biometric identification [39].
Typically, ORAMs are designed and used to solve the problem of DB
outsourcing [40]. This model would require the user to execute various
ORAM primitives so that the remote database is correctly shuﬄed. To
alleviate this processing task, and to make our protocol user agnostic, we
propose to use a Secure Multiparty Computation (MPC) scheme. MPC
schemes have been suggested in combination with ORAM constructions
in recent works (e.g., [41]).Under this extended protocol, every time a new
user data (e.g., Encpbiq and Encptiq) is added to the ORAM DB. The index
i is used to store the data mapping in a separate ORAM. The following
are the additional parties, operations and the protocol extension:
– MPC Agent: MPC mechanisms provide security against semi-honest or
malicious adversaries and in various coalitions, including computational security
against dishonest majorities e.g., [42]. An MPC agent, composed by different
distrustful players (computational parties) with competing interests can be
added to our scheme. These computational parties can be as many as needed,
to give the users confidence on the scheme and could be allocated by any
combination of the scheme participants. This agent has to store, in shared
form, an ORAM containing the mapping of the template database using i.
– MAPpiq: It returns the mapping of the template based on the shared index i
from the user. The mapping corresponds to the position to be queried on the
remote ORAM DB template.
– Shpiq: It is used to represent the secure secret sharing of the index i.
– Enrollment: The enrollment procedure is the same as described in Section 4.
However, at the end of the scheme, the client Ci provides pShpiq,Encpbiq,Encptiqq
to the MPC agent, who then stores i on its local mapping ORAM and appends
Encpbiq,Encptiqq to the J position of the physical DB of the cloud ORAM.
– Authentication: Similarly to the Enrollment, the authentication procedure
follows the same steps that are described at Section 4. In the same spirit as
before, once the client Ci has computed pEncpb1iq,Encpt1iqq, it is sent to the
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MPC agent instead, together with the stored index i in shared form. Then,
the agent uses i to extract the template and grants access to the cloud storage,
so that the original process can continue. To avoid revealing i to the CS, the
MPC agent sends the index directly towards the SP as i1.
These protocol extensions are oriented towards a task distribution.
Hence, they do not have an impact on the security properties of the
authentication scheme. It is worth noticing, however, that the security
with respect to the access pattern will depend solely on the underlying
ORAM and MPC protocols used by any implementation.
Biohashing for avoiding linkability of error patterns. The error
pattern bi‘b1i is disclosed to SP at the end of the authentication phase, as
shown in Section 4. This can disclose some information about the binary
biometric templates. For instance, the reliability of each bit can be different
among different users, so the error patterns can be used for tracking users.
In the ideal case, all the error patterns should be equiprobable for all the
users. In this case, disclosing the error patterns would not provide any
advantage to SP. However, this is difficult to achieve in practice.
A practical solution to this problem is to use biohashing techniques [43].
The usual approach for obtaining binary templates bi from biometric
features fi is by using a user-independent binarization transformation
bi “ Bpfiq. Biohashing consists of using a user-specific random transfor-
mation bi “ Bipfiq instead. The specific design of these transformations
ensures a minimum distortion in the distances in the transformed domain
with respect to the distances in the original domain, thus keeping the
discrimination ability of the biometrics unaffected. And the dependency be-
tween the error patterns and the user-specific binary templates’ reliability
is avoided, since changing Bi leads to an independent error pattern.
The incorporation of biohashing into our system is straightforward. The
user-specific random transformation Bi is generated during the enrollment
phase in the user client Ci, where it is stored and used to obtain the
enrollment binary template bi “ Bipfiq. During the authentication phase,
this transformation is used by Ci to obtain b1i “ Bipf 1iq. When the user
enrolls again, a new random transformation would be generated, thus
avoiding linkability between the previous and the new error patterns.
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6 Conclusions
We proposed an efficient scheme for verifiable computation of XORing en-
crypted messages, and successfully applied it to the scenario of distributed
biometric authentication, where the storage of the encrypted biometric
templates and part of the computations are outsourced to a cloud server.
The security and privacy of the proposed scheme has been proved in
a challenging and reasonable malicious internal adversarial scenario, as
opposed to the more usual and less realistic honest-but-curious scenario.
Additionally, ORAM is employed instead of prevalent PIR schemes to re-
duce the communication overhead while keeping the access pattern hidden
from the cloud. Moreover, Biohashing techniques are proposed to avoid
the disclosure of linkable error patterns. The efficiency of the proposed
scheme has been assessed by simulating the most computationally costly
parts of the proposed scheme, i.e. the homomorphic encryption primitives,
showing the feasibility and efficiency of the proposed solution.
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A Proof of Theorem 1
Proof. Let Π be the PPBA-HE-MAC protocol. The security of Π against
a malicious adversary A (i.e., CS) is defined via the following game.
ExpPrivΠ,Apλ, IDiq:
ppk, skq, ki,MAC.K Ð KeyGenpλ, IDiq; DB Ð EnrollpIDi,Encpbiq, kiq
pb1i0 , b1i1 q, b1i0 ‰ b1i1 Ð ApIDi, λ, pk,MAC.Kq;
β





β1 Ð A`IDi, λ, pk, b1i0 , b1i1 ,Encpb1iβ q,Encpt1iβ q,DB,Out˘;
Return 1 if β1 “ β, 0 otherwise
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where MAC.K is the key space for the employed MAC. The adversary’s
advantage is defined as AdvPrivΠ,A “
ˇˇ
2 PrtExpPrivΠ,Apλ, IDiq “ 1u ´ 1
ˇˇ
. If the
advantage is ď neglpλq, we say that Π is secure (and preserves the privacy
of biometric templates) against A.










Ci: SPpIDi, ctbi‘b1iβ , ctti‘t1iβ , i
1, skq:
Send pEncpb1iβ q,Encpt1iβ q, iq to CS iÐ IDi
Send IDi to SP If i ‰ i1 then
Return Out=0








Encpbiq,Encptiq Ð DBpiq Retrieve ki
ctbi‘b1iβ
Ð fpEncpbiq,Encpb1iβ qq If 0 ““ VRFYpbi ‘ b1iβ , ti ‘ t1iβ , kiq then
ctti‘t1iβ
Ð fpEncptiq,Encpt1iβ qq Return Out=0
Send pctbi‘b1iβ , ctti‘t1iβ , i
1q to SP If HWpbi ‘ b1iβ q ď τ then
Return Out=1
Return Out=0
The proof is based on the following two hybrid games. game 0: This is
the original game. Let S0 be the event that β
1 “ β.
game 1: This is the same as game 0, except that now CS always performs
the correct computation. Let S1 be the event that β
1 “ β in game 1.
Since providing a different index i1 than the correct one i always results
in K output, it does not help the adversary (i.e., the cloud) to win any of
the games. So we assume that CS always provides the correct index i.
Claim 1: |PrtS0u ´PrtS1u| is negligible. This follows from the -security
of the MAC scheme. Precisely, the difference between the two games is
that in game 0, VRFYpbi ‘ b1iβ , ti ‘ t1iβ , kiq ““ 0 if CS does not perform
the computation correctly, except for probability , while in game 1, that
does not happen as it performs the computation correctly. So the difference
between the winning probabilities in game 0 and game 1 is negligible.




ˇˇ ď neglpλq. This follows from the IND-CPA-security of the employed HE
scheme. Since otherwise, we can use the adversary A as a blackbox to con-
struct another PPT adversary A1 that can win the IND-CPA game against
the HE scheme with non-negligible probability in a straightforward fashion.
More precisely, the adversary A1 can use the challenge ciphertext in the
IND-CPA game to simulate the Π for A, and use A’s guess to win the
IND-CPA game against the HE scheme. Hence, combining the two claims,
we have that AdvPrivΠ,A is negligible.
